The main goal of the project is to contribute to poverty reduction by identifying effective policies and practices that enhance the ways that collective action and property rights are used to build secure assets and income streams for and by the poor. The project intends to provide policymakers, NGOs, and community groups with knowledge of the factors that strengthen rights of the poor to land and water resources and lead to more effective collective action by the poor. As a result, CGIAR centers and National Agricultural Research systems (NARs) partners will increase their capacity to integrate research on collective action and property rights into their work on agricultural technologies and natural resource management, and to work with community organizations.
Kapchorwa Site: Kapchorwa District Landcare Chapter; Uganda Wildlife Authority; Action Aid -Uganda; Local Government (LC5); the Benet Lobby Group; Local government departments of production; Parish Environment Committees; Tuban Organic Farmers Association (Tuban parish) and Tuikat Watershed Association; Kabale Site: Community-based NRM facilitators; local government (LC1 to LC5); NAADS structures; NRM Protection Committees; local government departments of production.
Project goal: To enhance livelihoods and the equitable distribution of benefits for the poor, women, and other local stakeholders in eastern African highlands through collective action, equitable NRM, grass-roots policy support, and widespread sharing of findings and approaches.
Methods: A series of 4 main methodologies was used: (i) Situation analysis (wealth ranking and wealth-disaggregated household interviews to identify levels of the 5 capital assets; focus group discussions to understand the role of local and external institutions in fostering changes in household assets); (ii) stakeholder workshops at site and national level to share findings and agree on priority areas for action research intervention; (iii) participatory action research on prioritized themes; and (iv) impact assessments by action research theme.
Findings: Local institutions serve livelihood security functions, are relatively equitable, but fail to address NRM; many external institutions are not seen as equitable; action research identified institutional and policy gaps for improved NRM, identified local and external stakeholders and supported negotiations between them to foster more collaborative solutions; and implemented integrated solutions involving technologies, social mobilization and by-law reforms. Collaborators: ICRAF, Regional Development Planning Agencies (Bappeda) in Bungo and Tajung Jabung Barat Districts, Jambi Province, Indonesia
Outputs:

Briefs
Project goal: The project seeks to identify the conditions under which collective action over property rights can help significantly redirect benefits from natural resource management, land use, and environmental services directly to local communities. The project aims to build local institutional capacity for inclusive local planning processes, focusing on building local communities' capacity to influence policy decision-making processes and rationalizing local tenure systems to give stronger legitimacy to local communities' rights to benefits, including the ecological and social benefits of effectively managed resources. The central goal is to determine how to reduce the ability of elite groups to hi-jack decision-making processes that enable them to maximize the economic exploitation of forest resources in their own interests.
Methods: Participatory Action Research, which includes community and inter-government agency facilitation, data collection and analysis, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and workshops.
Findings: Using participatory action research, it is possible to catalyze effective collective action among groups of men and groups of women in order to strengthen local self confidence and capabilities to interact and negotiate with powerful outsiders and bring pressure to reduce elite capture. Despite the difficulties, the approach seems to build some capacities and willingness among government officials to listen to a wider variety of stakeholders, increase respect for local community input, and to work across governmental sectors. Good and comparatively neutral facilitation is important in this process at both levels in order to foster collective action and clarify property rights over resources.
Outputs:
Papers: Project goal: Using two case studies of collective action (watershed management in India and group marketing in Kenya), the study aims to identify how local institutions and organizations evolve and function, what determines user participation in collective action, and the extent to which this can contribute to poverty reduction. While direct performance comparison is not intended, several policyrelevant issues are identified to draw useful comparative lessons from the two case studies.
Methods: Data was collected through structured and unstructured interviews at two levels: the microwatershed/marketing group level and the household level. The group-level data was analyzed to identify a few micro-watersheds for an in-depth study of the determinants of success or failure of collective action and its contribution to poverty reduction while the household-level data was used to identify the determinants of participation in collective action.
Findings: Effective collective action in watershed management improves natural resource conditions, reduces vulnerability to drought and improves cash incomes for the poor via diversification into marketable products; marketing groups pay farmers higher prices than do brokers and middle men. Performance improved where decision making is participatory, members make regular contributions and provided starting capital; levels of collective action in watershed management increase where groups have prior history of cooperation, where they have conflict resolution mechanisms, and are closer to markets.
" Project goal: To evaluate how collective action can be used by groups to buffer rural people's exposure to shocks in the short-term and to break the vicious cycle of poverty in the long-term. Results of the analysis will help policymakers identify what types of networks work best for the poor, enabling them to design interventions that enhance and/or compliment these network services.
Methods: Drawing from existing panel datasets in Ethiopia and Philippines, the study maps out networks that the poor rely on for risk management and/or risk coping and describes how different people rely on different networks to cope with different shocks. Econometric analyses are used to investigate the factors affecting consumption based indicators of poverty, with the specific aim of estimating the impact of shocks and testing the role of access to different networks.
Findings: Shocks play a significant role in the livelihoods of the poor; numerous networks exist in rural areas; the impact of networks on risk coping and livelihood varies: local networks are of limited assistance for covariate shocks, while some types of networks increase consumption and help deal with idiosyncratic shocks; better-off households have "better" networks. Project goal: To identify effective policies and practices for rural communities in Ethiopia that face multiple threats (natural disasters, ethnic conflict, and economic transition) in order to reduce poverty and secure sustainable rural livelihoods based on effective collective action and secure property rights.
The main purpose of the project is to sensitize policy-makers, NGOs, and communities about the links between collective action, property rights, and the local-level institutions in mediating effective collective action by households and communities, particularly in crisis situations, and to improve policies for poverty reduction and local institution building in Ethiopia.
Methods: This study combines quantitative and qualitative approaches with analytic narratives to allow a thorough analytical assessment of the factors that influence collective action, determine effective property rights, and provide an understanding of 'real life games' around local-level institutions, the actors involved, and their strategies.
Findings: Better-off households make more contributions (than intermediate and poorer ones) to collective insurance schemes, but they tend to participate with households of similar wealth levels; household participation in intra-clan insurance is higher than in schemes that cut across clans; lack of clarity in property rights results in extensive conflicts among groups, which results in humanitarian crises, livestock theft, and underutilization of pastures and market opportunities. Project goal: The project analyzes the linkages between property right regimes and collective action for the development of local-level institutions and governance structures to stabilize rural livelihoods in Cambodia. It explores how collective action in a risky political and natural environment can contribute to the build up of secure assets and income streams for and by the poor to reduce rural poverty. Examples of collective activities include community forestry, participatory land use planning, fisheries management, and a variety of agricultural and non-agricultural production systems. The main purpose is to provide policy makers, civil society organizations, and communities with insights on the links between institutions of collective action and property rights and poverty reduction in order to improve policies for poverty alleviation and local institution building in Cambodia.
Methods: Quantitative and qualitative data; secondary data sources such as stakeholder information of the region (NGO, ODA programs, administration, religious and social groups, etc.).
Findings: Despite prolonged, intentional efforts to eradicate voluntary collective organization and property rights institutions, informal collective initiatives are emerging (pagoda associations, savings clubs); however, the landless, land-poor, women, and those with lower levels of education are underrepresented in groups; local level collective action is also constrained by intimidation from external actors, e.g. military, foreign investors, high-ranking government officials.
"Collective action and natural resource management in rural Cambodia" (Anne Weingart); presented at IASCP Biannual Conference in Bali, June 2006.
